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In June and July 2008, two oﬃce workers were admitted to a Dublin hospital with Legionnaires’ disease. Investigations showed
that cooling towers in the basement car park were the most likely source of infection. However, positive results from cooling tower
samples by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) did not correlate with subsequent culture results. Also, many employees reported
Pontiacfever-likemorbidityfollowingnotiﬁcationofthesecond caseofLegionnaires’disease.Intotal,54employeesattendedtheir
general practitioner or emergency department with symptoms of Legionnaires’ disease or Pontiac fever. However, all laboratory
tests for Legionnaires’ disease or Pontiac fever were negative. In this investigation, email was used extensively for active case ﬁnding
and provision of time information to employees and medical colleagues. We recommend clariﬁcation of the role of PCR in the
diagnosis of legionellosis and also advocate for a speciﬁc laboratory test for the diagnosis of the milder form of legionellosis as in
Pontiac fever.
1.Introduction
Legionellosispresentsastwodistinctclinicalentities:Legion-
naires’ disease (LD) comprises pneumonia with severe
multisystem disease and Pontiac fever (PF) which is a self-
limiting ﬂu-like illness [1].
Annually, on average, 6 cases of LD were reported to the
Health Protection Surveillance Centre by the Departments
of Public Health in Ireland between 1994 and 2007. This
reported rate of two per million is low compared with other
European countries, such as Spain and France where rates
o f2 4 . 8p e rm i l l i o na n d2 2 . 8p e rm i l l i o nw e r er e p o r t e d ,
respectively, in 2007. In 2007, the overall European rate
of reported infection was 11.4 cases per million [2]. In
Ireland, the suggested reason for this low reporting rate is
a combination of underdiagnosis and underreporting of LD.
During the time period 1994–2007, there were no cases of PF
notiﬁed nationally in Ireland.
LD is transmitted from the environment by inhalation of
an infectious aerosol [1]. In Europe and Ireland, almost all
reported cases of LD are sporadic [2, 3] and the source of
the Legionella for these cases is rarely determined. However,
outbreaks may provide a better opportunity to identify
common sources of legionellae. Such outbreaks of LD can
be caused by communal sources such as hot tubs, spa pool,
hospital, domestic or hotel showers, and wet cooling towers
[4].
Over a ten-day period in June-July 2008, two cases of
LD were reported to the Department of Public Health,
Health Services Executive East (HSE-E) in Dublin. Both
cases worked in a large Dublin-based insurance ﬁrm and
were based in a newly built oﬃce block in the city. The
oﬃce building consisted of seven ﬂoors over a basement
car park. Two cooling towers were located in the base-
ment. The staﬀ smoking area was located immediately
adjacent to the cooling towers. Air conditioning within the2 Journal of Environmental and Public Health
building was conﬁned to the printing/postal room (3rd
ﬂoor) and the conference/meeting rooms (6th and 7th
ﬂoor). This paper describes the cases with LD, the outbreak
investigation, and subsequent management. A retrospective
cohort study of cases with PF will be reported separately
[5].
2. Methods
2.1. Epidemiological Investigation. T h eﬁ r s tc a s eo fL Dw a s
a 58-year-old Southern-European male smoker who worked
in the postal department on the 3rd ﬂoor of the company
oﬃce, and became unwell in early June. He was admitted on
June 25th to a Dublin hospital with a 3-week history of fever,
night sweats, chills, diarrhoea, and confusion. His chest X-
ray showed right upper and lower lobe consolidation. Liver
function tests and renal indices were elevated. Diagnosis of
LD was conﬁrmed by L. pneumophila serogroup 1 urinary
antigen test (UAT) on the day of admission. He was
admitted to the Intensive Care Unit for the management
of renal failure associated with LD and was treated with
clarithromycin. He was too ill to provide a history on
admission. He had no history of travel abroad. He was
hospitalised for 14 days. This case was notiﬁed to the Public
Health Department on June 27th.
On July 7th, a second case of LD (case 2) was reported
to the Department of Public Health. Case 2 was a 48-year-
old Irish male nonsmoker, who worked on the 5th ﬂoor of
the company oﬃc e .H eh a db e e ni l la n do ﬀ work for 7 days
preceding his presentation to the same Dublin hospital as
case 1, with a history of fever, headache, cough, diarrhoea,
confusion, and paraesthesia of arms and legs. On admission
he was diagnosed with pneumonia and LD was conﬁrmed by
UAT on the day of admission. He was treated on the ward
with clarithromycin and ciproﬂoxacin and was discharged
home after 10 days. Case 2 lived in a diﬀerent area of Dublin
from case 1. Apart from place of employment there were
no other common links such as travel or social activities
between both cases. As a result of two linked cases of LD an
outbreak control team was formed with representatives from
Public Health, Infection Control, Environmental Health,
Microbiology,theHealthProtectionSurveillanceCentre,and
the Health and Safety Authority.
On July 8th, it was reported to the Department of Public
Health HSE-E by company management that many employ-
ees were absent from work and had reported severe ﬂu-like
illness. Consequently, active case ﬁnding was carried out on
the morning of July 8th in the company. A standardised
questionnaire was emailed to all company and contract
employees who had worked in the building at any time
during the previous 14 days. Information was requested on
symptoms (cough, headache, fever, muscle pains, diarrhoea,
and ﬂu-like symptoms), potential exposure (oﬃce ﬂoor,
air-conditioning, and shower use), smoking, travel, and
demographics (Figure 1).
2.2.CaseDeﬁnitions. W edeﬁnedacaseofLDasanemplo yee
of,orvisitorto,thecompanyoﬃcewhohadpneumoniawith
onset since June 1st, and Legionella infection was diagnosed
by culture, UAT, or serology (a single high titre or a four-fold
rise in speciﬁc serum antibody to L. pneumophila serogroup
1o rs e r o g r o u p s2 – 6a n d8 ) .
We deﬁned a case of PF in the initial investigation as an
employeeof,orvisitorto,thecompanyoﬃcewithsymptoms
of fever, headache, myalgia, and nonproductive cough with
onset since June 1st.
2.3.FurtherInvestigations. Sicknessrecordswerereviewedby
Human Resources staﬀ and absent workers were contacted
to inform them of the outbreak and to enquire about their
health and whether they had sought medical attention.
Respondents who met our case deﬁnition for LD or PF
were promptly telephoned by Department of Public Health
medical or nursing staﬀ and advised on appropriate medical
follow-up.
Employees who attended the emergency department
(ED) or their general practitioner (GP) were followed up to
determine their symptomatology, investigation, results, and
treatment.Subsequently,adesignatedclinicwasarrangedfor
all employees and contract workers who (a) met our case
deﬁnition for PF or (b) had attended the ED or their GP
with concerns regarding LD. All were invited for Legionella
serology three weeks after likely exposure.
In total, 54 employees attended EDs in the Republic of
Ireland and Northern Ireland or their general practitioner
with symptoms and/or concerns about LD or PF; each had
a UAT, all of which were reported negative. Of these at least
38 were reported as having been treated with an antibiotic.
Subsequently, 37 of these employees with possible symptoms
of PF attended a special clinic for Legionella serology. No
employee tested showed serological evidence of infection
with L. pneumophila serogroups 1–6 and 8, three weeks after
likely exposure. The serological tests were performed by the
legionella reference services at the Respiratory & Systemic
Infection Laboratory, HPA Centre for Infections, Colindale,
UK.
2.4. Environmental Investigation. On July 8th, Public Health
doctors met on site with the company’s Health and Safety
manager, Risk Assessment manager, and Human Resources
manager. Public Health doctors, Environmental Health
oﬃcers of the Health Services Executive, and Environ-
mental Health oﬃcers of Dublin City Council conducted
an inspection and environmental risk assessment of the
building. On July 9th, the Health, and Safety Authority,
the organisation responsible for ensuring safety, health and
welfare at work, inspected the building. There were two
separate water-containing systems supplying the oﬃce. The
primary system consisted of two cooling towers located in
the large basement carpark of the building. Both cooling
towers were immediately adjacent to the staﬀ smoking area.
This system was used to chill incoming water. The secondary
system was a hot and cold water system used to service sinks
and showers. There was no physical connection between the
primary and secondary systems. Both systems were suppliedJournal of Environmental and Public Health 3
If yes, where 
Name
Contact telephone number (mobile preferred) 
Sex:  Male   Female 
Age Under 30  30 to < 45  45 to <60  60 +
Current smoker Yes      No
In the past fourteen days have you complained of: (please tick all that apply)
Unwell
Muscle pains
Headache
Fever
Diarrhoea
Flu-like symptoms 
Cough 
Have you attended your GP for any of the above in the last 14 days? No  
Where is your office located?   Floor  ____________ 
Is there air-conditioning in your work area?     Yes   No   
Have you used a work shower in the past 14 days?
Have you been in the company car park in the past 14 days?       Yes             No  
Have you been abroad in the past month?              No  
Yes
Yes  
Figure 1: Questionnaire for oﬃce workers distributed by email on July 8th 2008.
with mains water. Managers reported the use of an alarmed
temperature control system for the water supply to the
building. There was no fountain in the building.
Asaprecautionarymeasure,aftercase1wasreportedand
prior to any treatment, multiple water samples were taken
from both water systems and sent for PCR and culture for
Legionella spp. Mains water was checked at points entering
the building. Samples from tower 1 were positive by PCR for
Legionella spp.butbelowdetectionlevelonculture(Table 1).
Samples from tower 2 were positive by PCR for Legionella
spp. at lower levels than tower 1. However, L. pneumophila
was cultured from tower 2 at 100 colony forming units per
litre (CFU/L). Levels of L. pneumophila detected by PCR
from the showers/sinks tested were below the threshold level
for clinical signiﬁcance deﬁned by the chemical company,
andL.pneumophila wasnotculturedfromanyshowers/sinks
tested.
Both cooling towers were immediately deactivated,
cleaned, and disinfected as recommended [6]. The cooling
towers have remained inactive and are now replaced by a dry
cooling system.
2.5. Microbiological Investigations. Both patients admitted
to hospital were conﬁrmed cases of LD by L. pneumophila
serogroup 1 UAT (Binax). Sputum samples from both
patients, after they had commenced antibiotics, did not cul-
ture Legionella species. However sputum from case 2 sent to
the legionella reference services at the Respiratory Systemic
Infection Laboratory HPA was positive by PCR testing for4 Journal of Environmental and Public Health
Table 1: Microbiological results from cooling towers 1 and 2 by PCR and culture, Dublin, July 2008.
Cooling Tower PCR (GU/L) Culture (CFU/L)
Legionella spp. L. pneumophila Legionella spp. L. pneumophila serogroup 1 L. pneumophila serogroup 2–14
1 61,800,000 73,200,000 < Detection level < Detection level < Detection level
2 174,000 <3,300 100 100 < Detection level
L. pneumophila DNA. However, there was insuﬃcient DNA
to allow sequence typing of the strain. The environmental
isolate from cooling tower 2 was identiﬁed as L. pneumophila
serogroup 1, monoclonal antibody subgroup “Knoxville”.
2.6. Communication Methods. After the ﬁrst case of LD was
notiﬁed, an email alert was sent to 600 company employees
informingthemofthesymptomsofLDandadvisingthemto
seek medical attention from their general practitioner if they
had any concerns regarding illness. This alert was repeated to
allemployeesthreedayslater.Inaddition,everylinemanager
endeavoured to contact their employees to conﬁrm they had
received relevant public health information of LD and were
not symptomatic. Similar eﬀorts were also made to check on
contract employees and visitors to the company since June
1st. Following reporting of the second case of LD, an alert
was sent to all general practitioners and ED consultants in
the region by fax and email. In addition, due to the high
level of concern among the employees in the company, two
educational/information sessions on LD were held in the
oﬃce by medical doctors.
3. Discussion
This paper describes a cluster of LD among oﬃce workers
in Dublin. The only common link among the two cases
was their place of employment. Consequently, the most
likely source of this cluster was the cooling towers in the
basement car park. Deﬁnitive microbiological conﬁrmation
of the cooling towers as the source of infection required an
isolate from one of the patients to match the environmental
isolate. As L. pneumophila cultured from cooling tower 2 was
typed as serogroup 1 mAb2+ve which is a recognised cause
of clinical infection and also a serogroup detected by UAT,
we can reasonably conclude that cooling tower 2 was the
most likely source of this cluster. At present, Ireland does not
have legislation requiring the registration of cooling systems
at national level [6]. A system of statutory notiﬁcation
by the owner/occupier of such high risk sites, as recom-
mended in recently published National Guidelines, would
facilitate investigation and control of future cases/outbreaks
of legionellosis [2, 6].
Early identiﬁcation and treatment of patients with LD
have important implications for clinical management of
patients and outcome [7]. Studies comparing the clinical
manifestations of Legionella pneumonia to other types of
pneumoniaindicatethatLDisnot“atypical”andclinicalfea-
turessuchasdiarrhoeaandconfusionarenotsuﬃcientlydis-
tinctive to distinguish LD from other causes of community-
acquired pneumonia. Consequently, in order to increase
awareness of LD as a possible diagnosis, after the initial case
of LD was conﬁrmed we immediately corresponded with
companyemployees,management,aswellasGPandhospital
colleagues. Several outbreaks have observed a relationship
with the dose of inoculum. For example, an outbreak has
been described where two workers in a cooling tower with
diﬀerent levels of exposure developed pneumonia and PF,
respectively [3]. Immunological conditions and underlying
disease are among the factors that aﬀect susceptibility to
legionellosis [8, 9]. Such factors may explain the broad spec-
trum of clinical presentation in our investigation where the
majority of employees reported no symptoms, a substantial
number reported a mild ﬂu-like illness, and two employees
developed LD.
Few studies have addressed the practical value of PCR in
routine clinical and environmental microbiology laborato-
ries. PCR oﬀers theoretical advantages, such as a high sensi-
tivity, rapid availability of results, and the potential to detect
infections caused by various serogroups of L. pneumophila as
well as by nonpneumophila species [1, 10, 11]. Conversely,
the usefulness of PCR is limited by its inability to distinguish
between live, viable nonculturable and dead Legionella cells.
In this cluster, while PCR provided time information on the
number of Legionella in the environmental samples tested,
equivalence with the number of CFU by culture was not
found. Our results were similar to previous studies which
showed that PCR results are usually higher than culture
values [11, 12]. It could be argued that PCR is too sensitive a
methodthatdetectsviablenonculturableanddeadLegionella
cells that may not necessarily be pathogenic and thus PCR is
not an accurate measure of a real health risk. Nevertheless,
in this outbreak, detection of Legionella species by PCR
was a marker of environmental contamination by Legionella
and led to preventive measures. As culture of Legionella
remains the “gold-standard” in diagnosis of LD [2], we
suggest that PCR should complement rather than replace
traditional culture methods in routine clinical practice and
in monitoring industrial cooling water systems until its use
is further validated.
The aﬀected premises in this cluster ware a new
purpose built “green building” which was occupied for
three months prior to the reported onset of illness. A
green building is deﬁned as “the practice of increasing
the eﬃciency with which buildings use resources—energy,
water, and material—while reducing the building’s impact
on human health and the environment during the building’s
lifecycle, through better siting, design construction, oper-
ation, maintenance, and removal” [13]. However, despite
this aim, it is likely that malfunctioning of the cooling
towers’ microbiological control programme was the source
of employees’ illness in this outbreak. Illness because ofJournal of Environmental and Public Health 5
exposure to some unseen agent in a workplace can cause
alarm out of proportion to the risk [14]. In this outbreak,
the relative importance of panic and illness among workers
were diﬃcult to determine. However, the reported severity,
similarity, and duration of symptoms among staﬀ supported
the diagnosis of a PF-like illness. This diagnosis was based
on an epidemiological link and similar symptomatology
in workers. Absence of speciﬁc laboratory diagnostics for
PF mitigated against diﬀerentiation of psychological and
pathological causes of reported staﬀ illness. Improvements
in diagnostic testing could lead to a better understanding of
outbreaks of PF [15] and also help diﬀerentiate this illness
from other causes of inﬂuenza-like illness in order to direct
consequent appropriate remedial action.
The nonspeciﬁc presentation of LD makes clinical
diagnosis very diﬃcult in most patients with community-
acquired pneumonia of uncertain aetiology. Thus, the key
to diagnosis is appropriate microbiological testing [1]. Both
patients in this cluster were diagnosed by UAT. This test
detects L. pneumophila serogroup 1 antigens in a urine
sample within one hour with a speciﬁcity of 95% [9]. In
Ireland, in 2007, UAT was the principal diagnostic method
used for 75% of LD cases [2]. Sensitivity of UAT is associated
with the clinical severity of disease [1]. Thus, patients with
milder disease like PF may have been underdiagnosed if
UATs alone were used. Such a scenario has been previously
suggested by authors who claim that serology in cases of
PF is not consistently positive and also that the presence of
urinary antigen is not systematic in detecting L. pneumophila
serogoup 1 among PF patients [16–19]. Indeed many prior
s t u d i e so fU A T si nP Fh a v ev e r yl o wy i e l d s[ 19]. This may be
because these laboratory tests were primarily developed and
used for diagnosis, of LD in hospitalised patients. Thus, the
validity of these tests for those with mild clinical illness, not
requiring hospital admission, has not been established.
This investigation demonstrated that timely intervention
is vital in control of a cluster of legionellosis. In order to
control, and ideally prevent, future clusters of legionellosis
we recommend the statutory notiﬁcation of high risk sites
and also improved diagnostic tests.
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